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  Japan’s economic problems over the past decade and a half have triggered far reaching changes 
in the country’s corporate governance system and there have been significant changes in both 
companies’ ownership structures and composition of board members. This paper examines how 
board and ownership structures affect firms’ decision as to how to reduce labor costs when firms 
face excess employment. Our findings confirm that outside directors are more inclined to 
implement layoffs and voluntary or early retirement, while insiders are more likely to decrease new 
hiring and protect incumbent employees. These findings are consistent with the stakeholder view of 
the firm rather than the neoclassical view of firms as profit-maximizers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent research on corporate governance suggests that the management of 
firms is far more complicated than classical microeconomic theory assumes.
3 According 
to the stakeholder view formalized by Tirole (2001), not only shareholders and 
managers but also other stakeholders such as employees or customers may play 
significant roles in the decision-making processes of many firms. If the stakeholder 
view is correct and firms act in the interest of stakeholders, including employees, this 
might help explain firm behavior that appears to be inconsistent with profit 
maximization. 
Like their continental European counterparts, Japanese companies have long 
been regarded as stakeholder-oriented, a central feature of which is the so-called 
“lifetime employment system”.
4 This has traditionally provided workers with job 
security, while employers benefited through the accumulation of firm-specific human 
capital. Some researchers regard these employment practices as one of the most 
important characteristics of the Japanese economic system and argue that it achieves an 
efficient allocation of resources.
5  
On the other hand, the role of shareholders in corporate governance has been 
rather limited in Japan. Shareholder meetings in the 1990s, for example, typically lasted 
                                                  
3  A recent influential theoretical analysis of the stakeholder is provided by Tirole (2001), while Blair 
and Roe (1999) offer both a theoretical and empirical investigation into the importance of employees in 
corporate governance.   
4  Fukao and Morita (1997) and Morck and Steier (2005) compare corporate governance structures from 
an international perspective and discuss the characteristics of the Japanese system. Aoki et al. (1994) 
builds a model in which the Japanese long-term employment system and the main bank system are 
complementary, so that efficient resource allocation can be achieved. 
5  According to the “contingent governance theory” by Aoki et al (1994), monitoring by the main bank 
and the lifetime employment system are complementary features of Japan’s economic system, enabling 
Japanese companies to operate efficiently.   3
less than 30 minutes.
6 Large proportions of a company’s shares tended to be held by 
other companies and the percentage of free-float shares was very small, making hostile 
takeovers almost impossible. Also, there was often no clear separation between a 
company’s executive officers and its board of directors
7 That is, the supervision of 
managers on behalf of the company’s shareholders has not been the primary task of the 
board  of  directors  in  Japan.     
Since the mid 1990s, however, several noteworthy changes have occurred in 
firm ownership, board composition, and the number of employees in Japanese 
companies. Financial institutions have been decreasing their shareholdings, while 
foreign investors have been increasing theirs. At the same time, an increase in the ratio 
of outside directors in board composition can be observed, though inside directors are 
still dominant in many companies. These changes in firm ownership structure and board 
composition are accompanied by a decreasing trend in the number of people employed 
by large companies, partly due to prolonged stagnation of the Japanese economy in the 
1990s and large-scale downsizing. As a result of these changes over the past decade or 
so, large Japanese companies nowadays exhibit wide variations in their ownership 
structures, board composition, and employment practices. Some companies, such as car 
manufacturer Toyota, are seemingly holding on to their traditional governance style and 
long-term employment policies, while others, such as Fujitsu, an electronics company, 
have made large strides toward new governance schemes.
8  
                                                  
6  The length of shareholder meetings is gradually increasing, albeit very slowly. According to the survey 
“Kabunushi Soukai Hakusho 2003 (Shareholder Meeting Survey)” by Shouji Home, the average length 
of shareholder meetings was 43 minutes in 2003. 
7  Article 260.1 of the Commercial Law says: “The board of directors shall determine the administration 
of company affairs and supervise the execution of the duties of the directors.”   
8 A large part of the commercial law prescribing corporate governance was revised in 2003. The 
revision enabled Japanese listed companies to choose either the traditional governance system or the 
new, American-style, Company with Committee system.  See Abe and Jung (2004) for a detailed 
discussion of the revision.   4
If the long-term employment system is a part of the corporate governance 
system in Japan, recent changes in board compositions and ownership structures have 
potentially important implications for employment practices. Yet, little research has 
been carried out to examine how changes in the composition of boards of directors and 
in ownership structures have affected firms’ employment practices. In addition, 
previous studies have encountered difficulties in identifying companies that need to cut 
their labor expenses. For example, Kang and Shivdasani (1997) used a change in pretax 
operating income as a proxy for the degree of excess employment. In this study, we are 
able to address this issue from a different angle.   
The approach that we take here is to investigate which course of actions firms 
choose when they have to decrease labor costs. Rather than estimating the degree of 
excess employment, we take advantage of a unique survey that directly asked managers 
about the degree of excess employment and the way they plans to deal with the problem, 
such as through layoffs, wage reductions, etc. We further augment the survey by 
merging the results with other company information such as ownership structures, board 
compositions, and financial data. As far as we know, our data set is the first in Japan to 
integrate these variables at the firm-level. 
  Our empirical analysis arrives at the following interesting results. First, we 
observe a drastic increase in the share of outside board members in the 1990s. Second, 
the higher the share of outside directors, the more likely are firms with excess 
employment to implement lay offs and/or use voluntary or early retirement schemes. On 
the other hand, firms with a large number of inside directors are instead more likely to 
reduce new hiring to protect incumbent employees. This finding is consistent with the 
moral hazard view pointed out by Tirole (2001) which suggests that in firms where   5
employee influence is strong and directors are selected from among the employees of 
the firm tend to try to provide job security to incumbent employees at the cost of other 
stakeholders such as shareholders. On the other hand, we cannot observe any significant 
effects of differences in ownership structures.         
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an 
overview of changes in the composition of board members and employment levels at 
Japanese listed companies. Section 3 describes the dataset used in this paper. Section 4 
presents the specification of our equation for estimating how board composition and 
ownership structure affect the type of action managements choose to cut labor costs. 
Section 5 reports our estimation results and briefly discusses the possible bias that may 
be present if the composition of boards of directors is endogenously determined. The 
last section concludes. 
 
2. Changes in the Composition of Boards of Directors and in Employment Levels 
 
Japanese corporate governance is undergoing drastic transition. Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, a weakening in the relations between companies and their 
main banks can be observed.
9 And along with changes in business networks, another 
important change can be observed: change in the composition of boards of directors. 
Traditionally, boards of directors were rather large and primarily occupied by managers 
chosen from inside the company. However, in recent years, boards have been shrunk 
and the share of outside members has risen. 
  Table 1 provides data on the composition of the boards of directors of listed 
                                                  
9  See Fukao and Morita (1997) for a detailed discussion of the changes in corporate finance and 
ownership structures in Japan during the 1990s.   6
manufacturing companies in Japan. The table shows that in 1991, the median 
proportion of insiders among all board members was 74 percent, but the figure 
decreased to 67 percent in 2001. “Insiders” here are defined as board members who 
were chosen from among employees.
10  If we break down the ownership of shares, we 
observe a sharp decline in the proportion held by financial institutions from 34 percent 
in 1991 to 25 percent in 2001. 
  We also notice that the average number of board members declined to 14.7 
persons, down from 17.9 persons in 1991. This might be partly explained by the 
decade-long recession in Japan, which forced large firms to downsize their operations. 
Consequently, the median workforce also substantially declined from 954 employees 
in 1991 to 746 in 2001. These trends were accompanied by a decline in the return on 
assets (ROA). The ROA based on operating income decreased from 5.3 percent in 
1991 to 3.3 percent in 2001. The decline is larger if ROA is measured by profits before 
tax.  
  According to standard corporate governance theory based on principal-agency 
models, the roles of inside directors and that of outside directors are different.
11 Inside 
directors know details of the company that are not observable to outsiders. Looked at 
from the viewpoint of principal-agent theory, we could say that inside directors are 
managers that are monitored by outside directors which, in turn, represent the interests 
of shareholders. Observing CEO’s turnover-company performance sensitivity in the 
United States, Weisbach (1998) was able to confirm that outside directors act as 
monitors, while Abe and Jung (2004) found that outside board members play the same 
role in Japan. 
                                                  
10  This definition follows previous studies such as Kaplan and Minton (1994). 
11  Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Murphy (1999) provide excellent recent surveys.   7
In the macroeconomic literature, a similar hypothesis regarding the role of 
inside directors is provided by the Insider-Outsider theory formulated by Lindbeck 
(1993). According to the theory, incumbent workers are likely to try to protect their 
employment and wage levels by threatening management with strikes, other forms of 
non-cooperation, etc. That is, a company where insiders have more power than 
outsiders might pursue interests of incumbent employees. 
     Both corporate governance theory and macroeconomic theory predict that 
companies with fewer outside directors are more inclined to pursue the interests of 
their employees rather than of other stakeholders such as shareholders. Yet, to date, 
few studies have examined the relationship between excess employment and changes 
in the composition of boards of directors and ownership structures. Those studies that 
do exist have typically estimate the adjustment speed of the workforce size by 
examining the change between the current and the lagged workforce size.
12 These 
studies have serious defects in that they only deal with changes in employment on a 
net-, not on a gross-basis, without an in-depth examination of appropriate measures for 
excess labor at each firm. Moreover, these studies are based on the unrealistic 
assumption that all firms have the same production function. Our data set is able to 
overcome these serious shortcomings of previous studies and to provide direct 
evidence on the effect of changes in corporate governance on the measures chosen to 
reduce labor costs.   
 
3. Data Description 
                                                  
12  Odagiri (1992) and Suruga (1997) confirm that employment adjustment in Japan was slow until the 
early 1990s. Abraham and Houseman (1989) provide quantitative evidence for this evidence by showing 
that the elasticity of employment with respect to sales is 0.43 for U.S. firms while it is only 0.03 for 
Japanese companies.   8
 
This study utilizes three different data sources to create a unique and 
comprehensive dataset to examine the relationship between corporate governance and 
the means chosen to reduce labor costs, i.e. wage cuts, layoffs or natural attrition. The 
three different data sources can be matched completely.   
First, we take advantage of an original and rich firm-level survey data from 
the Annual Survey of Corporate Behavior (Kigyo Kodo ni Kan Suru Anketo Chosa) 
conducted in 2001 by the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. It is one of the most 
comprehensive datasets on corporate behavior in Japan and has a high response rate. 
The survey targets all listed companies in Japan.
13  Out of the 2,367 firms to which the 
government sent the questionnaire, 1,202 firms responded (719 manufacturing and 483 
non-manufacturing firms), for a response rate of 50.8 percent.   
The topic of the survey varies from year to year, but a number of questions 
remain the same, including those on managements’ subjective expectation of overall 
economic growth, industry growth, and the firm's anticipated investment. The 2001 
survey focused on corporate management, strategies to improve the firm’s financial 
situation, and measures for company restructuring. Concretely, the survey asked each 
company to judge the extent of the gap between the current and the optimal level of 
employment. This information on the perceived excess (or shortage) of employment 
enables us to identify companies that need to decrease labor costs.
14 
The survey moreover contains data on eight types of labor cost reduction 
                                                  
13 All listed companies on the Tokyo, Osaka or Nagoya Stock Exchanges (both first and second 
sections), excluding financial and insurance companies. 
14 An influential previous study by Kang and Shivdasani (1997) assumes that companies have excess 
capacity if their pretax operating income declined by more than 50%, while other studies such as Abe 
(1999) and Urasaka and Noda (2001) confine themselves to measuring the extent of the adjustment of 
workforce sizes without specifying companies with excess employment.   9
measures which have been implemented or are to be implemented in each firm: (1) 
reduction in bonuses; (2) reduction in wage rates; (3) reduction in managers' salaries; 
(4) reduction in executive payments; (5) reduction in working hours; (6) reduction in 
hiring new employees; (7) expansion of layoffs; and (8) introduction of voluntary 
(early) retirement.
15 As far as we know, this survey is the only source in Japan to 
combine comprehensive information on  both  excess employment and labor cost 
reduction measures. 
We combine the micro-level data from the Annual Survey on Corporate 
Behavior with information on the composition of the board of directors in each firm. 
Boards typically consist of more than 20 directors with a variety of backgrounds, 
which makes it difficult for researchers to identify the personal background of 
individual board members. We utilize the information available from Directors Data 
(Yakuin Shikihou) published by Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha. The dataset is released every 
year and provides detailed information on the board members of all Japanese listed 
companies, which enables us to discern insiders and outsiders. In this study, we define 
insiders as those who have been promoted from among employees, and outsiders as 
other directors. To construct variables on board composition, we use a dummy variable 
for former bankers, and variables on the ratio of insiders or outsiders in a board, 
following Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Morck and Nakamura (1999).   
                                                  
15 Japan’s legal system prohibits companies from laying off employees unless the company can prove 
this is absolutely necessary. The requirements for laying off workers are so stringent that most 
companies use many different measures to reduce the number of employees. “Voluntary (early) 
retirement” is one of the most popular methods. Still, the procedures required of the company to 
introduce such a retirement regime are complicated. First, the company has to disclose the retirement 
conditions, such as the amount of severance payment and the number of workers the company plans to 
let go. Second, the company has to wait for workers to apply for their retirement packages. That is, the 
company cannot select which workers it would like to stay and which to leave. This might lead to 
serious adverse selection problems because it is qualified and productive workers that tend to apply for 
retirement, obtain large severance payments, and then find another job. See Suruga (1997) for details.     10
Our third source is the official financial statements of all listed firms as of the 
end of March of each year. Financial variables from these statements for each firm are 
obtained from the “Nikkei NEEDS” database. We merge the financial statement data at 
the end of the fiscal year 2001 with the other datasets.   
In what follows, we confine our sample to 496 manufacturing firms for which 
all the variables for our statistical analysis are available. Basic statistics of the variables 
are reported in Table 2(a). The average proportion of insiders among board members is 
67 percent, substantially lower than the value reported in Table 1 for the beginning of 
the 1990s. The ownership share by the “special few” (see footnote), financial 
institutions, foreign companies is 44, 30, and 7 percent, respectively.
16 The average 
number of employees is about 2,400 and the number of board members is 15. 
Therefore, the sample contains slightly larger companies than the average companies 
reported in Table 1. The projected rate of growth over the next five years of the 
industry in which a company operates is on average 0.06%, i.e. practically zero.   
Table 2(b) shows that 64 percent of companies responded that they had excess 
employment. More than 30 percent of companies indicated that employment was 
excessive by 20 percent or more. Japanese listed companies began decreasing their 
workforces in the first half of the 1990s but even in 2001, many companies still 
thought that their workforces were too large. 
Table 2(c) reports the basic statistics only for firms with excess employment. 
While the value for most variables was similar to those for the overall sample, the 
                                                  
16  One of the listing requirements for the first tier of the Tokyo Stock Exchange is to keep the ownership 
share by the “special few”(Shosu Tokutei Mochikabu Hiritsu) to less than 70%. The ownership share by 
the “special few” is a proxy for the degree of the ownership concentration. The “special few” is defined 
as: (1) top ten shareholders; (2) board members and their relatives in the second degree; and (3) the 
company itself if it holds its own shares.   11
expected growth of the industry in which the company operated was slightly negative 
for those firms. Yet, even though firms in this subsample were more pessimistic about 
the future, their ROA was not very different from that for the overall sample. This 
suggests that expectations of the future play a significant role in companies’ decision 




  In this section, we conduct multivariate probit analyses to investigate the 
effects of board composition and ownership structure on the choice of labor cost 
reduction measures.
17 More concretely, we examine how a larger portion of outside 
(inside) directors affects which measures firms with excess employment adopt to cut 
labor expenses. We also analyze the effect of ownership structure on which measures 
are adopted. In each case, we use the information on the eight different types of 
measures to cut labor expenses described in Section 3.   
  For each measure, we construct a dummy variable that takes 1 if a firm has 
implemented or will implement it. In what follows, we restrict our sample to the 317 
firms with excess employment. The model we use consists of eight equations taking 
the following form: 
  ij ij ij ij j ij X X io InsiderRat y ε φ γ β α + + + + = 2 , 1 1 ,  
(i: firm index, 
  j: equation index that corresponds to the measure for labor cost reduction measures.  
                                                  
17   Multivariate probit models allow us to investigate the determination of multiple choices 
simultaneously. Since the error terms in each regression may not be independent, allowing for SUR is 
expected to improve the efficiency of the estimates. We reject the hypothesis that the error terms are 
independent.    12
j =1,2,.., 8) 
where  
1 i y   dummy variable for bonus reduction; 
2 i y : dummy for wage reduction; 
3 i y : dummy for reduction in managers’ salaries;   
4 i y : dummy for reduction in executive payments; 
5 i y : dummy for reduction in working hours;   
6 i y : dummy for reduction in hiring new employees;   
7 i y : dummy for layoffs;   
8 i y : dummy for introduction of voluntary (early) retirements. 
ij io InsiderRat : the ratio of insiders on the board of directors. 
ij X1 : Firm characteristics (ROA, departure from the industrial median of expected 
industry growth in the coming 5 years, the number of employees, the natural logarithm
of total assets, the excess employment index, and the dummy variable for the presence 
of bank-appointed directors). 
ij X 2 : Ownership structure (ownership shares by (1) the “Special Few”, (2) financial 
institutions, and (3) foreign investors). 
  As mentioned above, the ratio of inside directors is expected to have a 
negative effect on the adoption of measures that are costly for incumbent employees. 
Considering Japan’s illiquid labor market, job-loss is more costly for employees than 
wage or bonus reductions. A board dominated by insiders is therefore likely to consider 
employee benefits as most important. In our data set,  7 i y  and  8 i y , that is, layoffs and 
the introduction of voluntary (early) retirements, are measures that involve job-losses   13
for employees. On the other hand, the reduction in new hiring, 6 i y , does not directly 
affect existing employees. Therefore, we expect that the insider ratio has a positive 
effect on the reduction of new hiring. Moreover, a lower ROA, pessimistic 
expectations regarding future growth, the excess employment index (the greater this is, 
the more serious is excess employment), and the number of current employees are 
expected to have a positive effect on the adoption of labor cost reductions.   
  The effects of ownership structure are difficult to interpret a priori. If we 
consider the monitoring role of large shareholders or banks, a company with 
concentrated ownership or strong ties with the banking sector is more likely to cut jobs 
since strong monitoring forces the company to concentrate on profit maximization. On 
the other hand, if we adopt Aoki et al.’s (1994) view that assumes that main bank 
relationships are complementary to the lifetime employment system, a company with 
strong ties with banks is less likely to cut jobs. In addition, we may regard the degree 
of shareholding concentration as a proxy for traditional Japanese companies, which are 
typically protected from hostile takeovers by cross-shareholdings among firms. Since 
the expected sign of the coefficients on these ownership structure variables are unclear, 
we conduct the estimation using several different specifications. Finally, a larger 
foreign ownership share is expected to have a positive effect on the adoption of 
voluntary (early) retirements, 8 i y . 
 
5. Estimation Results 
 
     The estimation results are summarized in Table 3. In all regressions, we can 
observe a negative significant effect of the ROA on the measures related to   14
remuneration. That is, firms with a lower ROA tend to use all measures available to 
reduce wage costs. The coefficients on the projections for industry growth (deviation 
from the medium) are positive and significant for  reducing  bonus or executive 
payments but not for wage or executive salaries, implying that remuneration is closely 
related with a firm's current performance rather than its future prospects.   
     Next, we turn to the coefficients on the insider ratio. We observe negative but 
insignificant coefficients on wage reductions ( 1 i y  to  4 i y ). The coefficient on the 
reduction of new hiring ( 6 i y ) is positive and significant, suggesting that firms with 
insider-dominated boards are likely to rely on decreasing the hiring of new personnel 
as a means to cut the workforce. In contrast, the coefficients on layoffs ( 7 i y ) and 
retirements ( 8 i y ) are negative and significant. This means that firms with a higher 
proportion of insider board members are less inclined to embark on measures, such as 
layoffs, which are disadvantageous to incumbent employees. Taken together, these 
results indicate that insider managers are less likely to lay off current employees and 
instead are more likely to rely on reducing new hiring to reduce labor costs.
18  
  Finally, the coefficients on variables relating to ownership structure are 
generally insignificant.
19 Exceptions are the effects of the ownership share of the 
special few on retirements and working hour reductions. That is, companies in which 
share ownership is concentrated in a few hands are more likely to rely on decreasing 
working hours and to avoid job cuts. If we assume that the presence of the special few 
                                                  
18  Table 3 reports probit coefficients, not the marginal effects. Obtaining marginal effects of 
multivariate probit models is computationally cumbersome due to the large number of integrations.  
The marginal effects of the insider’s ratio on (1) the reduction in new hiring and (2) the implementation 
of early voluntary retirements based on a single equation probit are 0.4325 (the corresponding probit 
coefficient is 1.4417) and -0.6673 (-1.6729), respectively.   
19 W e tested various specifications of our model examining the effect of ownership structure. Appendix 
Tables A1-A3 show that the effects of board composition on the labor cost saving measures are stable 
under several different specifications.   15
is associated with traditional Japanese management practices, this result is consistent 
with effect we observed with regard to the proportion of insiders on the board of 
directors and the preferred means for r cutting labor costs. The ratio of the share held 
by financial institutions has a positive effect on layoffs. This might be the result of the 
monitoring role financial institutions play, such as when a main bank, for example, 
forces firms to concentrate on profit-maximization. However, it should be kept in mind 
that only 46 out of the 317 sample companies implemented layoffs (Table 3), and share 
ownership by financial institutions does not have a significant effect on other measures 
such as wage cuts or retirement policies. The coefficients on the ownership share of 
foreign investors are generally insignificant and no behavioral difference between 
firms with higher ownership share by foreign investors and other firms can be 
discerned. 
  The results can be summarized as follows. Among firms suffering from excess 
employment, those with a greater proportion of outside directors are more likely to lay 
off staff or resort of voluntary early retirement, while boards mostly consisting of 
insiders are more inclined to reducing new hiring. These results are consistent with the 
stakeholder view of the firm suggesting that inside directors are more concerned with 
protecting the interests of employees than with profit-maximization as assumed by 
neoclassical theory.   
  Lastly, we address the possibility that the endogenous determination of board 
composition seriously affects the results we have derived above. Kaplan and Minton 
(1994) and Morck and Nakamura (1999) show that appointments of outside directors 
are endogenous and correlated with companies’ performance. If bad firm performance 
leads to an increase in the portion of outside directors, the observed effect of the   16
insider ratio on labor cost reduction measures may be the result of a spurious 
correlation. One possible way to deal with the endogeneity issue is to use instrumental 
variables. As an instrument, we use the proportion of insiders in 1996, five years 
before the Annual Survey on Corporate Behavior in 2001 was conducted. 
Table 4 reports the results of the multivariate probit estimation in which the 
insider ratio of 2001 is replaced with that of 1996. The effect of board composition on 
layoffs and reductions in new hiring is similar to that reported in Table 3. There are 
two notable differences, however, namely in the effect on bonus reductions both for 
workers and for executives. In Table 3, the effect of the insider ratio on bonus 
reductions is negative but insignificant while in Table 4 it is negative and significant. 
These new results do not contradict our view that companies accord to the stakeholder 
model. The negative and significant effect of the insider ratio on bonus reductions 
implies that a company with a greater proportion of inside directors does not reduce 
bonuses even when the employment level is larger than the optimal level. This result 
might reflect the fact that companies in which employees are protected by 
insider-dominated boards of directors try to maintain remuneration levels at the 
expense of shareholders’ benefits.   
 
6. Conclusion and Outlook for Future Research 
 
     This is the first study to examine how changes in the board composition and 
ownership structure of listed firms in Japan have affected their labor cost reduction 
measures. Our unique firm-level data set, combining the degree of perceived excess 
employment, the board composition, the ownership structure, labor cost reduction   17
measures, and financial statement data, enables us to perform an integrated analysis of 
the implications of the transformation in corporate governance. Our findings confirm 
that outsiders are more committed to layoffs and to implementing voluntary or early 
retirement, while insiders are more inclined to decrease new hiring. This implies that 
outsiders contribute to the downsizing of employment, whereas insiders are more 
disposed to protecting incumbent employees. These findings are consistent with the 
stakeholder view of the firm rather than the neoclassical view of the firm as a 
profit-maximizer. 
Future research should also examine the relationship between changes in wage 
structure and corporate governance since traditional lifetime employment practices 
have been connected with a seniority wage system. It seems likely that the changes in 
board composition and the decade-long stagnation have affected the traditional wage 
scheme. Further research also should expand our analysis to include the adjustment of 
capital, i.e. measuring excess capital and firms’ strategies for reducing excess capacity, 
which would enable us to jointly examine restructuring strategies with regard to capital 
and labor. Such an analysis would shed light on the role of different types of outside 
directors. The determinants of the board composition in different economic situations 
are also of great importance.   
   18
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1991 Mean 17.85 0.4712 0.3429 0.0374 0.4906 0.7003 2595.0020 0.0529 0.2391
(1060) Median 16 0.4539 0.3375 0.0188 0 0.7405 953.5 0.0492 0.2443
S.D. 6.90 0.1341 0.1563 0.0601 0.5001 0.2188 6309.7830 0.0375 0.7253
Max. 55 0.8747 0.7834 0.7391 1 1 79801 0.3419 1.8425
Min. 6 0.0173 0.0040 0.0000 0 0 28 -0.1992 -17.6487
1996 Mean 17.75 0.4681 0.3188 0.0588 0.5000 0.6645 2351.3010 0.0309 0.1161
(1152) Median 16 0.4484 0.3174 0.0311 0.5000 0.7 886 0.0304 0.1364
S.D. 6.8 0.1354 0.1472 0.0761 0.5002 0.2186 5785.4810 0.0375 0.4914
Max. 60 0.8764 0.7067 0.6641 1 1 75590 0.1952 3.4981
Min. 4 0.1628 0.0032 0.0000 0 0 20 -0.1851 -10.9893
1997 Mean 17.7 0.4679 0.3163 0.0598 0.4877 0.6678 2277.3510 0.0368 0.1478
(1175) Median 16 0.4495 0.3115 0.0314 0 0.7143 846 0.0342 0.1517
S.D. 6.8 0.1376 0.1503 0.0790 0.5001 0.2177 5631.1000 0.0367 0.3600
Max. 61 0.9179 0.7022 0.6868 1 1 72193 0.1814 2.4421
Min. 6 0.0361 0.0031 0.0000 0 0 22 -0.2092 -4.0226
2001 Mean 14.7 0.4662 0.2726 0.0647 0.4808 0.6326 1981.4810 0.0366 0.0318
(1121) Median 14 0.4440 0.2474 0.0203 0 0.6667 746 0.0327 0.1046
S.D. 5.3 0.1478 0.1530 0.0953 0.4999 0.2254 4883.8270 0.0410 0.7224
Max. 63 0.9519 0.7012 0.7667 1 1 66005 0.2567 15.7157
Min. 6 0.0294 0.0015 0.0000 0 0 15 -0.1920 -5.7298
The data cover listed manufacturing companies in Japan.
Table 1: Changes in  Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in JapanMean Median S.D. Max. Min.
Proportion of insiders
among board members
0.6726 0.7143 0.2038 1 0
No. of employees 2393.07 1002 5187 54017 33
Board size 15.1552 14 5.2557 36 6
Percentage of shares
owned by the Special
0.4448 0 0.1407 1 0
Percentage of shares
owned by financial
0.3043 0.2817 0.1559 0.7012 0.0037
Percentage of shares
owned by foreigners
0.0737 0.0281 0.1007 0.6120 0.0000
Bank-appointed
director (dummy)
0.5020 1 0.5005 1 0
Total assets (Natural 18.0979 18 1.3106 22 15
Expected rate of
industry growth (.01%)
5.6714 5 32.7074 150 -200
Excess employment 6.9980 7 1.0627 12 4
ROA (Operating 0.0379 0.0343 0.0397 0.1794 -0.1716
N=496
 N=496
VariablesNo. of obs Percent Cum.
Excessive by more than 5 12 2 40 0.4
Excessive by 50% 11 0 0 1.21
Excessive by 40% 10 4 0.81 1.21
Excessive by 30% 9 27 5.44 6.65
Excessive by 20% 8 121 24.4 31.05
Excessive by 10% 7 163 32.86 63.91
No excess employment 6 164 33.06 96.98
Short by 10% 5 11 2.22 99.19
Short by 20% 4 4 0.81 100
(Note) There were no firms that responded that employment was short by more than 30%.
Mean Median S.D. Max Min
Proportion of insiders
among board members
0.6703 0.7059 0.2010 1 0.0909
No. of employees 2405.96 1065 4943 54017 100
Board size 15.0252 14 5.1188 35 7
Percentage of shares
owned by the Special
0.4389 0.4090 0.1381 0.7990 0.0383
Percentage of shares
owned by financial
0.3096 0.2927 0.1562 0.6771 0.0217
Percentage of shares
owned by foreigners
0.0724 0.0285 0.0981 0.5719 0.0001
Bank-appointed 0.5110 1 0.5007 1 0
Total assets (Natural 18.1289 17.9827 1.2845 22.1460 14.7613
Expected rate of
industry growth (.01%)
-1.3675 0 35.4833 142 -200
Excess employment 7.6215 7 0.7806 12 7
ROA (Operating 0.0315 0.0289 0.0344 0.1400 -0.1716
N=317
The sample contains listed manufacturing firms with excess employment.
Table 2(b): Degree of Excess Employment
Table 2 (c): Descriptive Statistics (Firms with Excess Employment) 





















Insider ratio -0.31338 -0.30038 -0.3089 -0.71354 0.44411 1.17353 ** -1.13823 * -1.6008 ***
(-0.66) (-0.63) (-0.65) (-1.56) (0.72) (2.57) (-1.89) (-3.36)
ROA (Operating income) -10.36911 *** -12.17497 *** -6.89271 *** -8.3843 *** 6.03599 ** 1.12666 0.24198 -3.29144
(-4.30) (-4.69) (-3.1) (-3.67) (2.00) (0.50) (0.09) (-1.44)
Expected rate of industry growth (.01%) 0.00454 * 0.00075 0.00675 *** 0.00301 0.00035 -0.0013 0.00591 ** -0.00237
(1.90) (0.33) (3.13) (1.33) (0.14) (-0.60) (2.38) (-1.08)
No. of employees -0.16127 -0.18379 -0.09969 -0.32007 ** -0.14682 0.01277 0.13709 0.34858 **
(-0.96) (-1.12) (-0.62) (-1.99) (-0.69) (0.08) (0.67) (2.13)
Total assets 0.05832 0.17372 0.05243 0.37308 ** 0.17598 0.06499 -0.10494 -0.07683
(0.36) (1.11) (0.35) (2.40) (0.86) (0.41) (-0.54) (-0.49)
Bank-appointed director -0.00135 -0.04857 -0.04036 -0.08117 0.12433 -0.07241 -0.18074 -0.25406 *
(-0.01) (-0.31) (-0.26) (-0.55) (0.63) (-0.49) (-0.96) (-1.67)
Ownership by the "Special Few" -0.65477 -0.52415 0.53999 -0.44837 1.878 ** 0.37542 -1.09042 -1.79501 ***
(-0.95) (-0.76) (0.80) (-0.69) (2.05) (0.55) (-1.25) (-2.58)
Excess employment index 0.16336 0.23404 ** 0.10038 0.20977 ** -0.26255 ** -0.13482 -0.27625 ** -0.22971 **
(1.54) (2.24) (1.02) (2.08) (2.11) (1.35) (-2.46) (-2.22)
Foreign ownership -0.52961 -0.76713 -0.34484 -1.36602 2.40423 0.72769 -0.29522 -1.03256
(-0.55) (-0.78) (-0.37) (-1.47) (-1.54) (0.76) (-0.28) (-1.05)
Ownership by financial institutions 0.00338 -1.18472 0.24602 -0.10828 0.14953 -0.56377 1.72974 ** -0.13707
(0.00) (-1.57) (0.34) (-0.15) (0.16) (-0.80) (2.02) (-0.19)
Constant 2.22643 0.19108 0.03113 -2.00415 -3.27126 -1.06947 2.06144 2.23092
(1.07) (0.09) (0.02) (-1.00) (-1.23) (-0.53) (0.84) (1.10)




Multivariate Probit Analysis. The sample consists of Japanese listed manufacturing companies observed in 2001.
The insider ratio is the ratio of insiders on the board of directors.
"Expected rate of industry growth" is the projected rate of growth over the next five years of the industry in which a company operates. We use the deviation from the industry median.
"Bank-appointed director" is a dummy variable that takes one if there is at least one director from a bank.
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Insider Ratio(1996) -1.37865 *** -0.60486 -0.18375 -1.01344 ** 0.36848 1.13091 ** -1.53931 ** -1.34147 ***
(-2.6) (-1.2) (-0.37) (-2.01) (0.57) (2.29) (-2.34) (-2.68)
ROA (Operating
income) -11.15093 *** -11.63703 *** -5.12429 ** -11.29473 *** 5.04674 1.6949 -0.86374 -4.58805 *




0.00375 -0.00198 0.00774 *** 0.0014 0.00202 -0.00269 0.00623 ** -0.00272
(1.49) (-0.8) (3.37) (0.59) (0.77) (-1.18) (2.45) (-1.18)
No. of employees -0.19985 -0.18253 -0.05984 -0.38285 ** -0.23364 -0.03074 0.0594 0.28428 *
(-1.13) (-1.07) (-0.37) (-2.26) (-1.07) (-0.19) (0.28) (1.72)
Total assets 0.07433 0.11429 0.01011 0.40212 ** 0.25793 0.05849 -0.11648 -0.09111
(0.45) (0.71) (0.07) (2.48) (1.24) (0.37) (-0.61) (-0.58)
Bank-appointed
director -0.05157 -0.06338 -0.01468 -0.13133 0.06027 -0.12756 -0.09265 -0.17628
(-0.32) (-0.39) (-0.09) (-0.85) (0.29) (-0.82) (-0.49) (-1.13)
Ownership by the
"Special Few" -0.94846 -0.86578 0.60701 -0.93887 1.77645 ** 0.30853 -1.5577 * -1.69628 ***
(-1.31) (-1.23) (0.89) (-1.37) (1.92) (0.44) (-1.72) (-2.42)
Excess employment
index 0.11859 0.29075 *** 0.1395 0.18935 * 0.32869 ** 0.08571 0.2752 ** 0.26384 ***
(1.05) (2.64) (1.38) (1.74) (2.5) (0.84) (2.23) (2.44)
Foreign ownership 0.06025 -0.40883 -0.3086 -1.00186 -2.65661 * 0.96978 0.78922 1.52949
(0.06) (-0.41) (-0.33) (-1.09) (-1.66) (0.95) (0.7) (1.56)
Ownership by
financial institutions 0.56436 -0.86594 -0.08142 0.30457 0.10246 -0.4704 1.89005 ** -0.11167
(0.73) (-1.12) (-0.11) (0.41) (0.11) (-0.64) (2.07) (-0.15)
Constant 1.17879 -1.99206 -1.10895 -4.2536 * -7.88288 ** -2.05074 -0.35288 -0.51000
(0.49) (-0.85) (-0.51) (-1.86) (-2.56) (-0.89) (-0.13) (-0.22)




Multivariate Probit Analysis. The sample consists of Japanese listed manufacturing companies observed in 2001.
The insider ratio is the ratio of insiders on the board of directors.
Expected rate of industry growth is the projected rate of growth over the next five years of the industry in which a company operates. We use the deviation from the industry median

























Insider Ratio -0.11389 -0.44559 -0.39659 -0.591 0.05592 0.91777 ** -0.31597 -1.05335 ***
(-0.28) (-1.13) (-1.01) (-1.50) (0.11) (2.38) (-0.65) (-2.66)
ROA (Operating income) -10.63711 *** -12.37673 *** -6.7087 *** -8.77353 *** 6.11836 ** 1.28882 0.36432 -3.32359
(-4.42) (-4.85) (-3.06) (-3.91) (2.14) (0.59) (0.13) (-1.47)
Expected rate of industry
growth (.01%) 0.00435 * 0.00038 0.00662 *** 0.0028 -0.00042 -0.00125 0.00623 ** -0.00221
(1.84) (0.17) (3.08) (1.25) (-0.17) (-0.58) (2.54) (-1.01)
No. of employees -0.19828 -0.21452 -0.08253 -0.3601 ** -0.1146 0.04395 0.08057 0.27457 *
(-1.21) (-1.34) (-0.53) (-2.28) (-0.54) (0.28) (0.41) (1.72)
Total assets 0.08039 0.10648 0.02555 0.34672 ** 0.01076 0.02499 0.0729 0.04497
(0.56) (0.75) (0.18) (2.49) (0.06) (0.18) (0.42) (0.32)
Bank-appointed director 0.01181 -0.07931 -0.05692 -0.08873 0.03169 -0.10053 -0.0418 -0.17261




Excess employment index 0.16292 0.22461 ** 0.09473 0.2051 ** 0.2081 * 0.13362 0.27227 ** 0.23547 **






Constant 1.62761 1.04909 0.71772 -1.66344 0.24889 -0.3505 -1.2936 -0.58931
(0.98) (0.64) (0.45) (-1.06) (0.12) (-0.22) (-0.66) (-0.37)




























Insider Ratio -0.32045 -0.56973 -0.25907 -0.75118 * 0.48409 1.0787 ** -0.7601 -1.62516 ***













(-4.36) (-4.83) (-3.12) (-3.85) (1.85) (0.53) (0.22) (-1.34)





0.00284 -0.00011 -0.00127 0.00615
**
-0.00214
(1.87) (0.17) (3.13) (1.27) (-0.04) (-0.59) (2.49) (-0.98)
No. of employees -0.16624 -0.20004 -0.10291 -0.33589 ** -0.17475 0.02018 0.15168 0.35678 **
(-1.00) (-1.23) (-0.64) (-2.10) (-0.82) (0.12) (0.75) (2.18)
Total assets 0.03812 0.08851 0.05061 0.31709 ** 0.10793 0.05507 -0.01195 -0.04945
(0.25) (0.60) (0.35) (2.21) (0.56) (0.38) (-0.07) (-0.34)
Bank-appointed director
-0.01036 -0.09321 -0.04323 -0.10353 0.09883 -0.07876 -0.09589 -0.24705
(-0.07) (-0.60) (-0.28) (-0.71) (0.51) (-0.53) (-0.53) (-1.64)
Ownership by the
























Constant 2.62153 1.5228 0.1412 -0.95505 -1.94831 -1.05512 0.59522 1.71432
(1.38) (0.83) (0.08) (-0.53) (-0.81) (-0.58) (0.27) (0.94)




























Insider Ratio -0.3275 -0.31989 -0.32348 -0.73574 0.45681 1.19012 *** -1.16253 * -1.59202 ***
(-0.69) (-0.67) (-0.69) (-1.61) (0.75) (2.60) (-1.93) (-3.34)
ROA (Operating income) -10.46726 *** -12.09959 *** -6.95506 *** -8.61316 *** 5.30002 * 1.35657 0.48381 -2.96373
(-4.35) (-4.71) (-3.14) (-3.81) (1.83) (0.61) (0.17) (-1.30)
Expected rate of industry
growth (.01%) 0.0044 * 0.00057 0.00667 *** 0.00272 -0.00012 -0.0012 0.00597 ** -0.00212
(1.86) (0.25) (3.10) (1.21) (-0.05) (-0.56) (2.39) (-0.97)
No. of employees -0.16678 -0.19328 -0.10715 -0.33608 ** -0.17065 0.01956 0.13228 0.3568 **
(-1.00) (-1.18) (-0.67) (-2.1) (-0.8) (0.12) (0.64) (2.18)
Total assets 0.03722 0.14311 0.03818 0.32209 ** 0.09614 0.09031 -0.09489 -0.03964
(0.24) (0.94) (0.26) (2.15) (0.48) (0.59) (-0.50) (-0.26)
Bank-appointed director -0.00887 -0.06126 -0.04761 -0.09769 0.09643 -0.06429 -0.18159 -0.24332
(-0.06) (-0.39) (-0.31) (-0.67) (0.49) (-0.43) (-0.96) (-1.61)
Ownership by the




(-1.01) (-0.87) (0.74) (-0.82) (1.91) (0.62) (-1.28) (-2.57)
Excess employment index 0.15955 0.22867 ** 0.09722 0.2032 ** 0.23843 * 0.14021 0.28091 ** 0.23537 **




institutions 0.02635 -1.12978 0.28003 -0.08312 0.16022 -0.5712 1.75115 ** -0.1492
(0.04) (-1.50) (0.39) (-0.12) (0.18) (-0.81) (2.03) (-0.21)
Constant 2.61573 0.76412 0.32143 -1.03972 -1.8315 -1.53318 1.9744 1.57818
(1.33) (0.40) (0.17) (-0.56) (-0.74) (-0.80) (0.83) (0.82)
Firms involved 204 105 108 186 36 194 46 156
N
Log likelihood
chi2 169.47431
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